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Purpose: Strategic transformations are likely necessary for all organizations at some point in 
their existence, but the role of external stakeholders in committing resources to support 
transformations has been largely overlooked. This paper aims to begin to fill this gap by 
developing a theoretical model detailing which factors increase the likelihood that financial 
stakeholders will commit resources to strategic transformation. Design/methodology/approach: 
Neo-institutional and stakeholder theories are applied to the strategic transformation 
phenomenon to develop six propositions regarding financial stakeholders’ resource commitment 
to strategic transformation. Findings: Moral legitimacy, pragmatic legitimacy and unfamiliarity 
with the firm directly affect the likelihood that financial stakeholders will commit resources to 
strategic transformation. Cognitive legitimacy or familiarity amplifies the positive effect of 
pragmatic legitimacy on resource commitment, and pragmatic legitimacy lessens the negative 
effect of unfamiliarity with the firm on resource commitment. Originality value: This paper lays 
out a clear conceptual model of the antecedents of financial stakeholders’ resource commitment 
to strategic transformation, aiding practitioners in securing critical stakeholder support and filling 
an important gap in strategic transformation/stakeholder literature. 
 







Change is inevitable. Consequently, all organizations will likely face the need to transform at 
some point in their existence (Burgelman, 1996). The impetus of such large-scale 
transformations can have many sources, including external forces like new technologies and 
shifts in consumer demand (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Porter, 1980) or internal forces like the 
arrival of new organizational leaders (Rosenbloom, 2000). Regardless of its motivation, 
discontinuous strategic transformation – a process of strategic renewal whereby an organization 
fundamentally changes its strategy, structure, or both (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009) – creates 
problems for organizations because it increases the odds of organizational death (Amburgey et 
al., 1993) and necessitates heightened levels of resource inputs for successful implementation 
(Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Penrose, 1959). 
 
Accordingly, scholars have demonstrated interest in how organizations cope with large changes 
and achieve successful strategic transformation, focusing especially on the internal 
organizational processes and mechanisms. Yet, the role of external stakeholders in achieving 
strategic transformation has not received much attention even though their commitment of 
critical financial resources is needed to implement large-scale change (Barker and Duhaime, 
1997; Bourgeois, 1981). 
 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding 
why financial stakeholders in particular support discontinuous strategic transformations by 
committing resources. Financial stakeholders are the focus here because their monetary 
contributions and/or decision-making power can enable or block strategic actions (Freeman, 
1984; Kuratko et al., 2007; Porter, 1980). Although other stakeholders, such as customers, may 
change after transformation, key financial stakeholders are likely to remain critical partners, and 
securing additional resources from them is vital for implementing transformation (Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997; Bourgeois, 1981). 
 
Understanding why financial stakeholders might support strategic transformations is important 
for strategic transformation research. First and foremost, firm- or leadership-level actions to 
implement a transformation may prove fruitless or impossible without the injection of critical 
financial resources. Second, as I discuss in more detail below, organizations are under increased 
scrutiny and pressure from financial stakeholders regarding the social benefits (or costs) of their 
activities, so financial stakeholders are increasingly interested in participating in firms’ strategic 
planning (Atkinson et al., 1997). Indeed, certain financial stakeholders, such as shareholders, can 
sometimes wield their power to block strategic initiatives (Anand and Singh, 1997; Porter, 
1980), and their (at least tacit) approval is therefore needed to undergo transformation. 
 
The framework presented herein supplements previous scholarly work on strategic 
transformation by adding knowledge about how firms acquire the resources necessary for 
transformation from financial stakeholders and why these steps are necessary for successful 
transformations. Practitioners contemplating transformation may benefit from suggested 
strategies for securing important resources to aid in the transformation process. In Section 2, I 
provide an overview of research relating to strategic transformation and the role of stakeholders 
in organizational change. Because radical organizational change is similar to beginning a new 
organization (Amburgey et al., 1993), legitimacy is a key concern. I therefore apply neo-
institutional theory to the entrepreneurial and stakeholder context of strategic transformation and 
propose that moral and pragmatic legitimacy are important precursors to financial stakeholders’ 
commitment of resources to strategic transformation (Section 3). I further delineate how 
cognitive legitimacy or familiarity increases the value of pragmatic legitimacy and how 
pragmatic legitimacy lessens the reluctance to commit resources of financial stakeholders who 
may be unfamiliar with the focal firm. Finally, in Section 4, I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of this framework for scholars and practitioners. 
 
2. Strategic transformation and stakeholder support 
 
Strategic transformations entail sweeping replacements or replenishments within organizations, 
resetting organizational goals, products, services, resources or capabilities with the objective of 
long-term growth (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). Such changes often occur rapidly in short periods 
of “punctuated equilibrium” (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), whereby old organizational 
processes or structures are quickly replaced with new ones. Because of this suddenness and 
speed of change, certain organizational structures are more readily amenable to transformation 
than others. Organizations with loosely coupled, modular divisions and the dynamic capabilities 
to adapt to rapidly changing environments can harness learning and knowledge across divisions, 
enabling them to undergo continuous transformation by shifting away from unprofitable 
industries and toward more profitable ones (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
 
Leadership is another important factor in strategic transformation. Before undergoing large-scale 
changes, leaders must overcome the cognitive inertia associated with previous strategies 
(Audia et al., 2000; Barr et al., 1992). Once the need for change has been recognized and 
transformation begins to be implemented, it can create role conflicts for managers that must be 
carefully navigated such that control systems are changed at crucial junctures in the 
transformation process (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Additionally, the mode of implementation must 
be carefully weighed. Path-breaking strategic transformations can be facilitated via acquisition or 
internal development (Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Karim and Mitchell, 2000), but leaders must 
do so judiciously, as the choice of internal or external development of new capabilities can create 
social friction within the organization (Capron and Mitchell, 2009). In total, literature regarding 
transformation has told us much about managing change within the organization but little about 
how change should be managed outside the organization, such as generating support among 
important financial stakeholders. 
 
Freeman (1984) posited that successful stakeholder management consists of identifying 
stakeholders and perceived stakes, understanding the organizational processes used to manage 
stakeholders, understanding the set of transactions or bargains among the organization and its 
stakeholders and ensuring these transactions fit with the organization’s stakeholder map and 
stakeholder management processes. Stakeholders have certain powers (formal/voting or 
economic/political) and certain stakes (equity, economic and influence). Identifying relevant 
organizational stakeholders is the first step in effective stakeholder management. Next, 
organizations should proactively and voluntarily manage stakeholders, using clear language 
when communicating with them and overspending on their needs to serve them better. To 
accomplish these tasks, organizations must have a strong sense of identity and strategy and 
understand their place in society. This will help them achieve fit between their values, the 
expectations of stakeholders and the social issues that determine their ability to sell products or 
services. In turn, stakeholders may affect an organization’s posture toward its environment: by 
proactively managing stakeholders, organizations may become more entrepreneurial, and 
stakeholders are therefore necessary partners when organizations seek change (Kuratko et al., 
2007) such as strategic transformation. 
 
Despite the importance of stakeholders for facilitating transformation, there is precious little 
research in this area. Most scholarly focus has been on the communication between managers 
and stakeholders, especially regarding how strategic changes are framed. For example, the 
characteristics of firm ownership (e.g. government ownership, family ownership, etc.) shape how 
managers frame or condense meaning when communicating changes to shareholders, and 
strategic changes may be more successful when the framing fits with different shareholder 
preferences, when it is appropriate to the institutional environment and when managers decouple 
the announcement and implementation of strategic changes (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). Similarly, 
different rhetorical techniques, such as analogy and metaphor, may be more appropriate for 
increasing stakeholder understanding, depending on the type and scale of change being pursued 
(Cornelissen et al., 2011). Finally, highly risky organizations, such as those operating in volatile 
environments, are more prone to alter their stakeholder management activities, probably because 
frequent strategic adjustments – and the corresponding stakeholder support – may be needed 
(Shropshire and Hillman, 2007). 
 
Yet, what is lacking is a robust theoretical explanation for why the stakeholders themselves 
might support or oppose a given strategic transformation. By understanding stakeholder 
rationales for supporting strategic transformations, managers can tailor and deploy the 
abovementioned framing and rhetorical strategies in a way that maximizes the odds of 
stakeholder support. Additionally, stakeholders can be very diverse, ranging from primary 
stakeholders, who are directly impacted by the firm (such as shareholders and customers), to 
secondary stakeholders, who may not be directly impacted by the firm (Eesley and Lenox, 
2006). To facilitate theoretical accuracy and meaningfulness, my focus here is on primary, 
financial stakeholders. Financial stakeholders are those with financial power, including investors, 
shareholders, lenders and creditors (Freeman, 1984). 
 
A concentration on financial stakeholders is used because such stakeholders may be the most 
important group for achieving successful strategic transformation. First, transformations are very 
resource-intensive (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Bourgeois, 1981; Penrose, 1959), requiring firms 
to look for external financial backing (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Specifically, during periods 
of transformation, organizations often proactively focus their stakeholder management activities 
on financial stakeholders because of the need for additional resources beyond those currently 
under their control (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). Second, if these stakeholders do not view 
transformation favorably, they can sometimes use their power to block it (Anand and Singh, 
1997; Porter, 1980), making the support of this group of stakeholders critical for successful 
transformation. Put differently, primary financial stakeholders provide unique value to strategic 
transformations. Monetary resources above and beyond those currently committed to the firm are 
needed to implement transformation (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 
2001). Furthermore, other stakeholder groups may not provide this important resource. For 
example, sales from existing customers may help sustain current firm operations but are unlikely 
to be enough to implement transformation. Additionally, key customer groups may change as the 
firm transforms and offers new products/services. Indeed, a time of reduced profit can follow a 
transformation (Rosenbloom, 2000), making resources from financial stakeholders even more 
critical. 
 
For these reasons, it is important for managers to actively shape the perceptions and opinions of 
financial stakeholders to garner their support for transformation (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). 
The following theoretical framework is a guide for doing just that, detailing the circumstances 
under which financial stakeholders are likely to commit resources to a proposed strategic 
transformation. 
 
3. Development of financial stakeholder resource commitment framework 
 
3.1 Theoretical lenses and assumptions 
 
Because transformation represents a fundamental change in a firm’s strategy and/or structure, it 
is somewhat similar to the launch of a new organization, in that the firm must learn new modes 
of operating. Indeed, any kind of strategic change – and especially a large one such as 
transformation – resets the liability-of-newness clock (Amburgey et al., 1993), resulting in a very 
high risk of failure during the initial period following change (Freeman et al., 1983; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). For example, as the typewriter industry declined, Smith Corona attempted 
to become an office supply company. However, the transformation was a failure and the 
organization died because it could not develop the competencies needed to compete in the new 
industry (Danneels, 2010). Organizations that transform will thus face some challenges similar to 
the ones new organizations must grapple with, as they must learn anew how to compete using a 
novel strategy and/or organizational structure. 
 
As noted, another challenge associated with strategic transformation is the acquisition of 
resources, which is also a problem faced by new entrepreneurial organizations (Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002). Numerous scholars have argued that strategic transformation is a type of corporate 
entrepreneurship (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Kuratko et al., 2007; Sharma and Chrisman, 
1999; Zahra, 1991). Because of the similarities between transformation and starting a new 
venture in terms of liabilities of newness and acquiring needed external resources, I draw on 
literature from entrepreneurship – in addition to strategic transformation and stakeholder theory –
to explicate the antecedents of financial stakeholders’ resource commitment to strategic 
transformation. A large part of this literature involves gaining legitimacy, as having high levels 
of legitimacy motivates stakeholders to support an organization rather than passively allowing it 
to exist or perhaps even working against it, according to neo-institutional theory (Suchman, 
1995). Additionally, gaining legitimacy is one of the primary challenges of successful 
entrepreneurship (Williamson, 2000). I, therefore, apply neo-institutional theory to theorize how 
strategic transformation might meet legitimacy concerns of financial stakeholders. 
 
To set the tone for my arguments and facilitate nuanced theoretical development, I assume that 
organization leaders can recognize the need for transformation and manage the process. I also 
assume some level of monitoring or involvement on the part of the focal firm’s current financial 
stakeholders although the exact amount may vary among them (e.g. large shareholders may 
monitor more than creditors). Without at least a little monitoring, it is unlikely that stakeholders 
would commit anything to the organization (Suchman, 1995). However, I also assume that the 
level of monitoring can vary among stakeholders and may be low for those who have more of an 
arms-length relationship with the firm or those who have no pre-existing relationship with the 
firm. I deal with this issue explicitly below when I theorize about the level of familiarity between 
the firm and its financial stakeholders. 
 
Within the bounds of these assumptions, I propose that moral legitimacy is the ultimate precursor 
of resource commitment, the establishment of which allows financial stakeholders to proceed to 
assessing the value-creating potential of the transformation or its pragmatic legitimacy. The 
greater the pragmatic legitimacy, the greater the odds of resource commitment. I further propose 
that cognitive legitimacy or familiarity with the firm can enhance this relationship. Finally, I 
theorize that unfamiliarity with the focal firm undergoing transformation may lessen the chances 
of resource commitment, but this negative relationship can be attenuated with greater pragmatic 
legitimacy. These relationships are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework of financial stakeholders’ commitment to strategic transformation 
 
3.2 Antecedents of financial stakeholder resource commitment 
 
Neo-institutional scholars have investigated how sociological forces, such as norms, shape social 
actors, including organizations (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991). Organizational theorists have 
stressed the need for organizations to conform to these social norms to gain legitimacy (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) or “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy enhances the stability and 
comprehensibility of organizational activities, and, if social actors (such as the government and 
customers) perceive these activities to add value to society, they may actively support and trust 
the organization rather than just passively acquiesce to its existence or seek its dissolution. 
Legitimacy is especially important for gaining financial resources that can then be used to 
acquire other resources needed for firm operations (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). For example, a 
legitimate organization can more easily gain funds from investors and use these funds for 
operational or strategic purposes. 
 
Suchman (1995) distinguished between three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy is exchange-based, in that external actors will scrutinize how an 
organization’s activities will affect their self-interests and lend their support if the organization’s 
activities will benefit them. Moral legitimacy rests on the perception that the organization’s 
activities are good for society as a whole. Finally, cognitive legitimacy is the comprehensibility 
of an organization’s activities: if external actors cannot understand what an organization does 
and how its processes function, they may not actively support that organization. To achieve full 
cognitive legitimacy, however, the firm’s actions must be understood to the point of being taken 
for granted. Put differently, complete cognitive legitimacy means that stakeholders would view 
alternative firm activities as unthinkable. 
 
Each of these types of legitimacy is important for organizations to survive. Yet, because strategic 
transformation entails engaging in novel activities, organizations must establish the legitimacy of 
the transformation when they undergo these large-scale changes (Cornelissen et al., 2011). Next, 
I discuss how legitimacy affects financial stakeholders’ commitment of financial resources to 
strategic transformation. 
 
3.2.1 Moral legitimacy. 
 
Moral legitimacy connotes stakeholders’ perception that an organization’s activities benefit 
society. Although moral legitimacy may seem simple to attain, in that most stakeholders would 
not question the morality of profit-seeking activities (Choi and Shepherd, 2005), in the wake of a 
global financial crisis and various financial scandals, doing so may be more complicated. Thus, 
when organizational managers seek a strategic transformation, they must first convince financial 
stakeholders of the goodness of the new activities. 
 
Because they contribute critical financial resources, financial stakeholders have significant 
power in affecting the course of the organization (Freeman, 1984; Porter, 1980) and often wield 
this power to ensure organizations conform to their sense of morality. For example, the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) – the largest public pension fund in 
the USA – frequently intervenes in companies in which it invests to promote more transparent 
corporate governance practices (Smith, 1996). Similarly, some religious organizations will not 
invest in businesses that contradict their values – such as alcohol, gambling and weapons 
manufacturing – because in their estimation, these business practices lack moral legitimacy 
(Guay et al., 2004). 
 
Many financial stakeholder groups that are not inherently values-driven, organizations are also 
increasingly concerned about the ethics of the businesses in which they invest and are more 
likely than ever to divest from companies which they do not view as ethical. For example, 
institutional investors like large universities have divested trillions of dollars from the oil 
industry because of concerns about global warming (Carrington and Howard, 2015). Similarly, 
as a somewhat novel type of business, firms in the private security industry must take many extra 
steps to convince financial stakeholders of the ethics of their operations (Elms and Phillips, 
2009). It stands to reason, then, that financial stakeholders would, at the very least, not commit 
resources to strategic transformations they view as immoral. At worst, they might seek to block 
such transformations. When undergoing transformation, managers must therefore ensure that the 
firm’s new activities fit with the values of critical financial stakeholders and with society in 
general. Failing to do so may lead to an unsuccessful transformation or, at worst, organizational 
death. When an organization pursues activities that are perceived as immoral, it can lose the 
support of a wide range of stakeholders, resulting in an often sudden organizational death 
(Hamilton, 2006). 
 
Just as new or novel businesses must establish that their practices are ethical, managers 
attempting a strategic transformation must convince financial stakeholders of the morality of the 
proposed new activities. Importantly, the establishment of moral legitimacy must take 
place before pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy, as an organization’s activities must broadly be 
acceptable to the stakeholders before they can determine how they might benefit from a 
relationship with the organization or assess whether its activities are taken for granted (Suchman, 
1995). Hence, moral legitimacy is a necessary first step in the process of legitimizing a strategic 
transformation to gain resources from financial stakeholders. Thus: 
 
P1. Moral legitimacy of a strategic transformation is a necessary condition for financial 
stakeholders’ commitment of resources to that transformation. 
 
3.2.2 Pragmatic legitimacy. 
 
Though a necessary condition for financial stakeholders’ commitment of resources to a strategic 
transformation, moral legitimacy is, by itself, likely insufficient. This is because, in the words 
of Suchman (1995, p. 575): “To avoid questioning, an organization need only ‘make sense.’ To 
mobilize affirmative commitments, however, it must also ‘have value […] ’”. In other words, 
moral legitimacy may be enough for financial stakeholders to leave an organization alone. For 
example, if CalPERS already views an organization’s corporate governance practices positively, 
it may be less likely to intervene to try to change those practices. However, to extract a financial 
commitment from financial stakeholders, managers of organizations undergoing strategic 
transformation must be able to demonstrate that the transformation will add value for these 
stakeholders. Hence, when an organization undergoes a strategic transformation, one of the first 
questions financial stakeholders might ask after establishing moral legitimacy, is: How will this 
benefit us? 
 
Although pragmatic legitimacy may have already been established when the relationship 
between an organization and its current financial stakeholders began, because transformation 
entails a fundamental change in strategy and/or structure, managers must present a new value 
proposition to stakeholders to renew their support. Furthermore, transformation may mean a 
radical change in organizational posture, creating the potential for discrepancies between 
stakeholder values/goals and post-transformation organizational values/goals and, therefore, the 
potential loss of pragmatic legitimacy. For example, managers may seek a transformation to 
enhance their own job security, status or the organization’s growth, which may not align with 
investors’ preference for wealth maximization (Anand and Singh, 1997; Hill and Jones, 
1992). This happened at Hewlett-Packard, where CalPERS forced the resignation of top officers 
after three ill-advised acquisitions (Smith, 2013). If financial stakeholders believe the 
transformation may not align with their goals, they may be hesitant to commit resources to 
support it. Therefore, after moral legitimacy has been established, attaining pragmatic legitimacy 
for transformation activities will increase the odds of financial stakeholders’ commitment of 
resources. 
 
As an illustration of this mechanism, consider the investment funds of nonprofit organizations. 
For example, Sierra Club and the Humane Society of the USA both have investment funds, and 
both funds invest in firms that share the respective values of these nonprofits (Guay et al., 2004). 
Clearly, the recipients of these investments have moral legitimacy in the eyes of their nonprofit 
investors. Yet, because they are financial stakeholders, the investment funds of Sierra Club and 
the Human Society also seek a return on their investments; that is, they would likely not invest in 
companies that share their moral values but have little potential to create economic value. 
Similarly, although a strategic transformation may not be at odds with their morals, financial 
stakeholders will want to know the potential for value creation before committing resources for 
its implementation. Therefore, moral legitimacy is necessary but not sufficient for the 
commitment of resources from financial stakeholders, as the strategic transformation must also 
create value for them. 
 
One way pragmatic legitimacy can be established is by assessing the connection between the 
goals of an organization and the goals of its financial stakeholders, such as growth or greater 
stock value. A broad range of stakeholders have been found to support organizations if they 
perceive their goals as matching those of the organizations in question (Choi and Shepherd, 
2005). If the goals of the strategic transformation and those of financial stakeholders are 
consistent, pragmatic legitimacy will likely be established, making financial stakeholders more 
likely to commit resources to the transformation effort, as supporting it will help them reach their 
own goals. For example, investors must anticipate higher returns on their investments following 
an acquisition before committing resources to leveraged buy-outs (Bull, 1989). In this case, the 
organization may seek an acquisition for strategic reasons, whereas financial stakeholders may 
seek greater returns. Yet, a sensible acquisition could fulfill both goals, creating an exchange 
whereby both the organization and financial stakeholders benefit and, hence, pragmatic 
legitimacy. 
 
Unlike moral legitimacy, however, pragmatic legitimacy may not be necessary for financial 
stakeholders to commit resources. If financial stakeholders are unsure regarding how a 
transformation may benefit them, they may choose to make initial investments and see how it 
plays out, with the option of removing support later on (McGrath, 1999). Alternatively, simple 
inertia may lead certain stakeholders to continue their support of the organization during 
transformation, choosing not to object so long as the organization’s actions generally make sense 
to them and do not blatantly violate norms (Suchman, 1995). Finally, powerful leaders in the 
organization, such as board members or CEOs, may be able to convince stakeholders to support 
transformation, even if pragmatic legitimacy may be lacking (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). In 
sum, though not necessary, pragmatic legitimacy should increase financial stakeholders’ 
proclivity to commit resources to a transformation. These theoretical insights lead to the 
following: 
 
P2a. Pragmatic legitimacy of a strategic transformation is assessed after establishing 
moral legitimacy and increases the likelihood of financial stakeholders’ resource 
commitment to the strategic transformation. 
 
3.2.3 Cognitive legitimacy. 
 
Likely the most difficult form of legitimacy to achieve, cognitive legitimacy reflects a deep 
understanding of what an organization does to the point that firm activities are “taken for 
granted”, and social actors see almost no basis to question them because they cannot conceive 
that things might be otherwise (Suchman, 1995). As such, cognitive legitimacy is different from 
moral and pragmatic legitimacy because it does not involve an evaluation on the part of 
stakeholders but rather reflects how well they comprehend the activities for the firm. 
 
Unsurprisingly, taken-for-granted status “generally lies beyond the reach of all but the most 
fortunate managers” because there are so many competitors and strategic options in free markets 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 583), and, hence, stakeholders could plausibly think of many different 
strategic transformations the focal firm could undertake or they could simply think the firm 
should not undertake a transformation at all. Taken together, these insights suggest that cognitive 
legitimacy – unlike moral and pragmatic legitimacy – is not a direct antecedent of resource 
commitment because it is so elusive and difficult to achieve. Practically speaking, it is difficult to 
imagine cognitive legitimacy always or almost always being present when strategic 
transformations take place. For example, when Intel morphed from manufacturing memory chips 
to microprocessors, the transition was very combative because many stakeholders could not 
comprehend Intel’s move away from an industry where it had been so successful; yet, Intel did 
eventually transform without high levels of cognitive legitimacy (Burgelman, 1996). 
 
However, when cognitive legitimacy of a strategic transformation is achieved, it could amplify 
the positive effects of pragmatic legitimacy. First, if the transformation is cognitively legitimate, 
then financial stakeholders could, theoretically, not think of alternatives. Thus, the strategic 
transformation would be the only conceivable option, and it would benefit them if it is also 
pragmatically legitimate. Second, the in-depth comprehensibility conveyed by cognitive 
legitimacy would allow stakeholders to see more clearly how the transformation might create 
value for them. When cognitive legitimacy of transformations is absent, “stakeholders find it 
difficult to consistently weigh risk/reward trade-offs […] as they have no tangible evidence that 
such actions will pay off” (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, p. 651). For example, in its failed attempt to 
become an office supply company, Smith Corona managers had a difficult time convincing board 
members (representing shareholders) to support the transition, largely because they were more 
familiar and comfortable with the typewriter industry in which the company had always 
competed (Danneels, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, when cognitive legitimacy is achieved, financial stakeholders should be able 
to understand more precisely how the strategic transformation will benefit them because they 
understand the activities of the firm well, reducing the causal ambiguity of the mechanisms that 
create value for stakeholders. That is, they could realistically assess the benefits that may accrue 
to them because of the transformation. Indeed, cognitive legitimacy has been shown to increase 
the likelihood of stakeholder commitment to a long-term relationship with new ventures because 
it reduces the uncertainty involved in the relationship (Choi and Shepherd, 2005). Similarly, 
financial stakeholders of existing organizations will be more likely to lend support to a strategic 
transformation with pragmatic legitimacy when there is also cognitive legitimacy because there 
is less uncertainty regarding how the transformation will create value for them. Thus: 
 
P2b. Cognitive legitimacy of a strategic transformation increases the positive impact of 
pragmatic legitimacy on the likelihood of financial stakeholders’ resource commitment to 
that strategic transformation. 
 
3.2.4 Unfamiliarity with the firm. 
 
As mentioned previously, strategic transformation is akin to forming a new organization in that it 
requires the use of financial resources, which are often sourced from external stakeholders 
(Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). Importantly, firms undergoing transformation may need to seek 
out resources from new financial stakeholders or they may need to seek out additional resources 
from financial stakeholders with whom they have more of an arm-length relationship, such as 
creditors. Thus, the level of unfamiliarity with the firm will likely play an important role in the 
decision to commit resources to the transformation, as this is an important aspect of the 
relationship between stakeholders and firms (Sen et al. 2006). Indeed, familiarity conveys a type 
of legitimacy distinct from the others discussed heretofore: whereas moral, pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy involve stakeholders’ general acceptance of certain activities, familiarity is 
a form of legitimacy that connotes awareness of a specific organization (Williamson, 
2000). Additionally, some familiarity with a given firm is likely needed for stakeholders to 
determine its moral, pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy. 
 
Financial stakeholders who are less familiar with the focal firm should, in general, be less likely 
to commit resources to a strategic transformation. This is because unfamiliarity increases the 
risks for financial stakeholders: they do not know the firm well enough to be sure of its general 
legitimacy, and, hence, they cannot be assured that they will receive the desired return on their 
investment (Williamson, 1979). Conversely, financial stakeholders are more likely to support 
firms with whom they are familiar (Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Williamson, 2000). This is likely 
because stakeholders have a more generalized sense of confidence in the firm’s ability to provide 
a return on their investment, perhaps based on previous performance. Even if the firm is 
transforming because of poor performance, investors often use their existing knowledge of the 
firm’s capabilities to gauge its potential for future success (Adler and Chaston, 2002). This logic 
should also apply to strategic transformations, as financial stakeholders who are familiar with the 
firm can more accurately gauge the odds of a successful transformation than those who are 
unfamiliar. These insights suggest that financial stakeholders – be they new or existing – who are 
less familiar with the firm would be more cautious when committing financial resources to a 
strategic transformation: 
 
P3a. The more unfamiliar a firm is to financial stakeholders, the lower the likelihood of 
financial stakeholders’ resource commitment to that firm’s strategic transformation. 
 
Although financial stakeholders who are less familiar with the focal firm should, in general, be 
less likely to commit resources to a strategic transformation, this negative effect could be 
mitigated if there is strong pragmatic legitimacy for the transformation. In these cases, the 
potential benefits of committing resources to the transformation could outweigh the uncertainty 
of forming a new/stronger relationship with a less familiar firm. Indeed, despite the hazards 
relating to liabilities of newness, financial stakeholders are more likely to form a long-term 
relationship with new ventures when they perceive that the relationship aligns with their goals 
and will benefit them (Choi and Shepherd, 2005). Similarly, the risks of committing resources to 
a less-familiar firm undergoing transformation could be outweighed by the potential rewards if 
there is a strong alignment between the goals of the firm and the financial stakeholder in 
question. 
 
For example, Uber is undergoing a transformation as it morphs from a new venture to a global 
enterprise. Although it is a privately held company (that is, its practices are not transparent or 
familiar to outsiders) based in the USA that only recently began operations in Saudi Arabia, the 
country’s Public Investment Fund committed $3.5bn to help fuel Uber’s international expansion 
(Isaac and de la Merced, 2016). Despite a somewhat high degree of unfamiliarity with Uber, the 
Saudi Public Investment Fund managers concluded that the investment was worth the risk 
because the country seeks income streams beyond its traditional reliance on oil revenues (Isaac 
and de la Merced, 2016), and they thought that Uber could help them reach this goal, even 
though the company is somewhat unfamiliar. These insights lead to the following: 
 
P3b. The negative effect of financial stakeholders’ unfamiliarity on the likelihood of 
committing resources to a strategic transformation decreases as the pragmatic legitimacy 
of the transformation increases. 
 
Finally, familiarity may be an effective substitute for cognitive legitimacy in terms of enhancing 
the effect of pragmatic legitimacy when financial stakeholders decide whether to commit 
resources to a strategic transformation. Previously, I have argued that cognitive legitimacy 
should amplify the impact of pragmatic legitimacy, as it will enable stakeholders to understand 
more thoroughly how the transformation could create value for them. Yet, I also pointed out that 
cognitive legitimacy is, practically speaking, very difficult to achieve. Only in rare circumstances 
do stakeholders have a full and complete sense of a firm’s activities, such that a proposed 
strategic transformation would be the only conceivable option known to them. 
 
In cases where cognitive legitimacy is not achieved, familiarity could be an effective substitute. 
Although financial stakeholders in such a scenario may not have a complete understanding of the 
transformation or may be able to conceive of other strategic options for the firm in question, their 
familiarity with the firm could be a source of confidence. Here, having a general (rather than 
extensive) knowledge of the firm and an established relationship with it enables stakeholders to 
be more comfortable taking a risk in supporting a strategic transformation that meets their goals 
(Das and Bing-Sheng, 1998), even though the transformation may entail activities that the 
stakeholders do not understand well. This is because familiarity – in a general sense – makes a 
firm appear more predictable and trustworthy, even when it undertakes entrepreneurial actions 
like transformation (Williamson, 2000). 
 
When a strategic transformation meets the threshold for pragmatic legitimacy, financial 
stakeholders who are also familiar with the firm should be more likely to commit resources than 
those who are unfamiliar. Put another way, financial stakeholders could potentially invest in 
many firms. Yet, it is not sensible to commit resources to a firm undergoing transformation 
simply for the sake of investment; financial stakeholders must also have confidence that the 
investment will pay off (McGrath, 1999). A general familiarity with the firm helps provide that 
confidence, even if cognitive legitimacy (“taken for granted” status) is not achieved. In sum, 
although cognitive legitimacy may be difficult to achieve, familiarity could play the same role in 
amplifying the positive effect of pragmatic legitimacy on stakeholder commitment of resources 
because it provides a sense of confidence in the firm. Thus: 
 
P3c. Familiarity with a firm can substitute for cognitive legitimacy when affecting the 
impact of pragmatic legitimacy on the likelihood of committing resources to a strategic 
transformation. 
 
4. Discussion and implications 
 
An understanding of stakeholder commitment of resources is an important, but under-explored, 
aspect of strategic transformation, which is a critical means of maintaining organizational 
vitality. Burgelman (1996, p. 210) noted that “ […] firms continue to exist, in part, because old 
product-market strategies get replaced by new ones, and old distinctive competencies give way 
to new ones”. By securing resources from critical financial stakeholders, managers can proceed 
with the process of strategic transformation and ensure the continued existence of the firm. I 
have theorized here that moral and pragmatic legitimacy are direct antecedents of the likelihood 
of financial stakeholders’ commitment of resources to strategic transformation. Additionally, 
cognitive legitimacy or familiarity can play a moderating role. Although unfamiliarity with the 
focal firm may reduce the likelihood of resource commitment, increasing levels of pragmatic 
legitimacy should dampen this effect. Next, I discuss the implications of this theory for scholars 
and practitioners. 
 
4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The theoretical framework presented here has numerous implications for scholarship regarding 
strategic transformation. It complements a robust stream of research on managing transformation 
within the organization by showing why managing transformation outside the organization – in 
the form of gaining support from financial stakeholders – is a necessary step in transformation 
implementation and by showing how this external management of transformation can be 
accomplished with regards to financial stakeholders. This contribution is important and timely: 
stakeholder theory has been criticized for focusing too much on how stakeholders affect firms’ 
short-term financial performance, with few implications for organizations’ long-term strategy 
and viability (Laplume et al., 2008). The framework presenter here is a step toward addressing 
this criticism because it details how and why stakeholders are needed during strategic 
transformations, which are themselves critical for long-term performance (Agarwal and Helfat, 
2009; Burgelman, 1996). 
 
Moreover, by theorizing the drivers of stakeholder resource commitment, I demonstrate how 
established prescriptions for communicating transformation to stakeholders can be harnessed to 
achieve a successful strategic transformation. The type of firm ownership influences how 
managers should frame or condense meaning when communicating changes to shareholders (Fiss 
and Zajac, 2006), suggesting that managers must frame their cases for legitimacy carefully to 
convince financial stakeholders to commit resources to a transformation. Similarly, because 
framing should match the institutional environment (Fiss and Zajac, 2006), managers must 
ensure that their framing of transformation communication to shareholders is consistent with the 
legitimacy demands of the institutional environment. Specifically, metaphors (rather than 
analogies) which are relational (that is, exhibit many deep counterparts rather than a few 
superficial ones) that fit within these constraints would maximize financial stakeholders’ positive 
perceptions and understanding of proposed transformations (Cornelissen et al., 2011). 
Additionally, framing the transformation as balanced in its goals may help financial stakeholders 
understand that the change will benefit diverse groups of stakeholders; conversely, an 
acquiescing framing can be used to communicate the singular benefits of the transformation to 
financial stakeholders (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). Table I summarizes some of the strategies that 
could be deployed to gain legitimacy for transformation. 
 
Table I. Managerial strategies for developing legitimacy for strategic transformation 
Type of legitimacy Managerial strategies 
Moral Use of balancing framing (Fiss and Zajac, 2006) 
 Isomorphism (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) 
Pragmatic Use of acquiescence framing (Fiss and Zajac, 2006) 
 Use of past performance record (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) 
Cognitive Use of relational metaphors (Cornelissen et al., 2011) 
 Use of symbolic language and actions (Zott and Huy, 2007) 
 
Future research could empirically investigate these prescriptions, examining which strategies on 
the parts of managers lead to greater resource commitment on the parts of financial stakeholders. 
Additionally, more work is needed to understand other specific strategies for garnering resources 
for strategic transformation. Although there have been scholarly prescriptions for framing 
change, how different types of legitimacy can best be demonstrated to outside groups is not 
known. There has been some related work that might be applicable. For example, Zott and Huy 
(2007) analyzed how entrepreneurs leveraged symbolic actions in order acquire resources from 
relevant stakeholders. They categorized four types of symbolic actions that can convey personal 
credibility, professional organizing, achievement or the quality of stakeholder relationships. 
Although these actions were performed by entrepreneurs, they could potentially be used by 
managers seeking resources for transformation to underscore the legitimacy of the firm and the 
proposed transformation. Narratives can also replace external validation as a means of attaining 
legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). If managers can lay out their vision for the transformation in 
an entertaining, engaging story, stakeholders may be more receptive and more willing to 
overlook the potential risks involved. Scholarly work is warranted to determine if these strategies 
could apply to the transformation process and how they fit with legitimacy. 
 
Finally, given the importance of stakeholders to transformation, much more research is needed 
regarding how and why they support transformations. Although the focus here was on financial 
stakeholders, scholars could use the theoretical framework as a baseline to investigate why other 
stakeholders, such as employees, regulators, community members, etc., might support strategic 
transformations. Different stakeholders are affected by the firm in different ways and can have 
very different goals, so unique theories are likely needed for different kinds of stakeholders. 
 
4.2 Managerial implications 
 
To secure resources, first and foremost, managers should have well-established processes for 
dealing with stakeholders, as delineated above. By investing early in effective stakeholder 
management, managers can create productive relationships and increase the odds of stakeholder 
resource commitment for transformation before it is even considered. Additionally, managers 
should carefully consider the legitimacy of strategic transformations, and how this legitimacy 
might be perceived by financial stakeholders. The strategies displayed in Table I could be used to 




Strategic transformation is an important part of an organization’s life cycle (Burgelman, 
1996) but is not well understood. I have explicated the antecedents of key financial stakeholders’ 
resource commitment to transformation. Change may be inevitable, and it can create difficulties 
for organizations; however, organizations that embrace it as an opportunity for reinventing 
themselves will likely weather the storms of change better than those that succumb to inertia. 
The theory presented here offers a roadmap for how financial resources can be garnered to 
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